(3) Gina Taranto a. It isn't clear that Briscoe is a detecti ve, which makes sense, since he's not a detecti ve. b. Is it clear that Briscoe is a detective? (3a) is not contradictory, and (3b) is indetenninate between a reading in which the speaker questions Briscoe's detecti vehood, and one in which she wonders whether this proposition is 'clear' to the addressee. In spite of the fact that Discourse Adjectives fail the two standard diagnostics for factivity, it is hard to deny the strong flavor of factivity that sentence (2) carries. That is, it really feels like it is clear that Briscoe is a detective entails that Briscoe is a detective.
A Case Study of the Semantics of Clear

1. The Paradox of Asserting Clarity
The starting point for an analysis of clear is a quick review the Paradox of Asserting Clarity, first introduced in Barker and Taranto (2002) . The dilemma that underpins the paradox arises from the standard assumption in (4) , that an assertion is felicitous only if it adds new information to the common ground.
After all, what use could it be to claim that a proposition is true if it is already accepted as true? The answer advocated by Barker and Taranto is given in (5).
(4)
Informativeness Constraint on Assertions An assertion is felicitous on ly if it adds new information to the common ground. (after Stalnaker 1979 :325, van der Sandt 1992 (5) Some sentences can have side-effects besides adding new information about the world to the common ground, and it can be worth asserting a sentence entirely for the sake of these side-effects. (Following Beaver (2002» Returning to the central example for this paper, the sentence in (2), the observation is that intuitively, if (2) is true, then before it is uttered, the speaker and the addressee must already believe that Briscoe is a detective: if either is not already convinced that Briscoe is a detective, then it isn't clear at all. But, if it was already evident that Briscoe is a detective, then asserting (2) adds no new information to the context, contra the assumption spelled out in the Informativeness Constraint in (4). This leads to Lemma 1, elaborated in (6).
(6) Lemma 1 If (2) is true, it adds no new information to the context, so why bother to assert it?
!. '.
How DISCOURSE ADJECfIVES SYNCHRONIZE THE SPEAKER AND THE LISTENER'S BELIEFS
(IT IS CLEAR THAT BRISCOE IS A DETECTIVE)
Lemma I could be resolved by showing that an utterance of (2) does add new information to the common ground namely, the information that Briscoe is a detective. However, this would give rise to Lemma 2, which is elaborated in (7).
(7)
Lemma 2 Assume (2) entails Briscoe is a detective. If the speaker has decided that Briscoe is a detective on the basis of information shared by the speaker and addressee, then (2) only adds information if the speaker assumes that the addressee has not come to the same conclusion, in which case it is not in fact clear that Briscoe is a detective, otherwise the addressee would have realized it on her own.
In other words, perhaps (2) can only be used in situations in which the addressee is an idiot: she has all the evidence she needs to realize that Briscoe is a detective, but she fails to take that last logical step. To consider such a situation, assume that the propositions in (8) are true, Briscoe, who works for the NYPD detective di vision, is walking alongside Detective Logan , and he's waving his pistol, badge, and magnifying glass.
( 8) a. Briscoe works for the NYPD detective di vision. b.
Briscoe's partner is a detective, Detective Logan. c.
Briscoe carries a pistol and magnifying glass wherever he goes. d.
Briscoe carries a detective's badge.
To be even more explicit, imagine that the sentences in (8) have just been uttered by B. That's when A replies with her own version of (2), an utterance of the sentence in (9).
(9) Clearly you fool, Briscoe is a detective !
The Framework -Gunlogson (2001)
The starting point for the formalization of the proposed analysis of the semantics of clear is Gunlogson's adaptation of a Standard Stalnakerian Model.
Some of the key points of this model are outlined in ( 10). c. The Context Set of a Discourse with two participants A and B (CSA,B) is an ordered pair of sets of the discourse commitments of A and B: the commitment set of A (CSA) includes the worlds of which A's public beliefs are true; the commitment set of B (CSB) includes the worlds of which B's public beliefs are true. d. Asserting a sentence S: remove all worlds from the commitment set of the speaker in which S is not true.
Points in (lOa through c) establish that the common ground of a di scourse is construed as the individual sets of possible worlds corresponding to the way the discourse participants individually believe the world might be. Point (lOd) explains that when a sentence is asserted the common ground is updated by removing from the speaker' s commitment set all of the worlds in which the proposition expressed by the sentence is not true. An example of the affect of an utterance of Briscoe is a detective is provided in (12). The model of possible worlds under consideration is in (11). Odd numbered worlds are worl ds in which Briscoe is a detective, and this is emphasized with bold-type. Even numbered worlds are worlds in which Briscoe is not a detective. C is biased toward p iff P is a public commitment of exactly one discourse participant.
( 14)
C is neutral toward p iff neither discourse participant is committed to either p or W-p.
Resolving the Paradox
With the basics of Gunlogson's adaptation of a standard Stalnakerian model established, it is possible to continue an analysis of the semantics of clear by picking up with the with the observation that Discourse Adjectives aren't facti ve. The proposed analysis respects the fact that there are a number of possibilities for the way the world might be, and that these are ordered in terms of their plausibility. For instance, regarding the proposition that Briscoe is a detective, in any given world the possible explanations might include that Briscoe is a detective, as in world nine, or that he's not a real detective, he's getting dressed up for a Halloween party, or perhaps even the more unlikely alternative in world twelve, that Briscoe is not a detective at all, but the CIA wants us to believe that he is.
( 1 5) Possible explanations for the evidence suggesting that Briscoe is a detective, from most to least likely: W9 = Briscoe is a detective.
W l O = Briscoe isn't a real detective, he's getting ready for a Halloween party. W ll = The pistol and magnifying glass belong to Briscoe's brother, but coincidentally Briscoe is a detective, too. W l 2 = Bri scoe isn't a detective, but the CIA wants us to believe that he is.
Nothing in the sentences in (8) rules out any of the possible worlds given in ( 15). But because in some of these worlds Briscoe isn't a detective, update with sentence (2), it is clear that Briscoe is a detective will at least eliminate those worlds in which Briscoe isn't a detective. This result is suspicious, since simply asserting that Briscoe is a detective will achieve the same result. This leads to the fo llowing question: why not just assert that Briscoe is a detecti ve, why ever assert that it's clear that Briscoe is a detective? At thi s point it should be clear why a speaker might be reluctant to assert that Briscoe is a detecti ve: because Briscoe might not be a detective -there are other live possibilities.
Since it is known from Grice that it is uncooperati ve to assert something for which one lacks sufficient evidence, it would be uncooperative to claim that Briscoe is a detective unless one was absolutely certain. If this thinking is on the right track, the conclusion is that clarity is asserted only in contexts in which there is some lingering uncertainty that the complement is in fact true. However, if this is right, it leads to a new problem: the original paradox has been reconstructed, only in reverse. The reconstructed paradox is given in (16).
The Reconstructed Paradox
It is clear that p is only asserted in situations in which it is in fact not clear that p!
The key to resolving this paradox depends on appreclatmg how the grammar deals with degrees of probability. In other words, the appropriateness of asserting clari ty depends on the degrees of probability of different explanations for the facts. Situations in which the applicability of a predicate depends on degrees are well known in the literature: what we're dealing with here is vagueness, or the observation that in a given situation, it's not always clear how clear a proposition needs to be to count as clear.
3.3. 1. Vagueness (Fine 1975 , Williamson 1994 , 1999 , Kennedy 1997 Following Barker (2002) , and Barker and Taranto (2002) the proposed analysis makes use of a delineation function that takes a situation and an adjective meaning, and returns the vague standard for the adjective in the given situation. This is written as in (17). The idea is that different possible worlds may differ precisely in the standard they impose on a vague adjective. So in one world the absolute standard may be set higher or lower than it is in another world. By using a mechanism that allows for a representation of the vagueness inherent in predications of clarity, the truth conditions of (18a) That Briscoe is a detective is clear can be characterized as in (18b). (18) a.
That Briscoe is a detective is clear. During a conversation, one thing is certain about the world; that a conversation is taking place, that the speaker is speaking, that the hearer is being addressed, and so on. Therefore every possible world in the initial context will be a world in which the conversation underway is taking place.
When the assumptions in (19) are incorporated with what is known about vague predicates the result is the observation in (20): that worlds in a context may vary with respect to the values assigned by delineation functi on s. (20) One way in which the worlds in a context may vary is in the value of their delineation function for the version of the conversation in that world.
Based on the assumptions of (19) and (20) The proposal in (21) claims that updating the commitment set of a discourse participant x with the information expressed by it is clear that p will yield a set of worlds in which the maximal degree to which p is likely to be true in x ' s commitment set is as least as great as the delineation function requires in that world. This analysis captures the connection between likelihood and clarity, and specifies the respect in which asserting clarity is similar to asserting the applicability of a vague predicate. However, it cannot be ri ght. The problem is that in Gunlogson's model (as well as other Stalnakerian models), propositions don 't have probabilities. For any gi ven possible world, either Briscoe is a detective, or he's not. No matter what the standard for clarity is, worlds in which the probability is 1 will survive update according to (2 1), and worlds in which the probability is 0 will not. Thus, in the absence of acknowledging probability, the meaning of it is clear that Briscoe is a detective is identical to the meaning of Briscoe is a detective, which has already been shown to be incorrect.
The Solution
This problem raised by the analysis in (21) can be solved by building on the observation that likelihood is a judgment made by some sentient creature who is contemplating p. Therefore, if likelihood plays a role in assertions of clarity, we need to figure out who is judging likelihood. An important clue to the identity of the experiencers of clarity comes from comparing a simple assertion of clari ty to one in which the experiencer is overt. Consider the data in (22). (22) a. It is clear that Briscoe is a detecti ve.
ASSERTION OF SIMPLE CLARITY
b. It is clear to me that Briscoe is a detective.
ASSERTION OF PERSONAL CLARITY
c. (Surely) It is clear to you that Briscoe is a detective.
In the revised analysis, the meaning of (22a) is approximated as the conjunction of (22b and c): if it is clear that Bri scoe is a detective, then it is clear to the discourse participants that Briscoe is a detective. This suggests refining the context change potential in (21) as in (23), which considers judgments of likelihood at each world. So (23) recognizes that belief is a gradient attitude, and behaves just like any other vague predicate. In practical terms, this means that if a speaker asserts (24a) it is clear to me that Briscoe is a detective with the semantics in (24b), then only those worlds will survive update at which the speaker believes that Briscoe is a detective.
(24) a. It is clear to me that Briscoe is a detective.
Worlds that are excluded will include worlds in which there is enough uncertainty to reduce the speaker' s belief of Briscoe's detectivehood to below that world's specified threshold for clari ty. Worlds may survive in which Briscoe is not a detective, as long as the speaker believes that Briscoe is a detective in that world.
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In (25) 
Imagine a situation in which the speaker, A, is unaware of the CIA plot; her utterance of (24a) is modeled in (26). The input context is as modeled in (26a), and the result of her utterance eliminates world ten -the world in which A does not believe Briscoe is a detective -from her commitment set. Her commitment set still includes world twelve, a world in which Briscoe isn't a detective, but because in this world there is sufficient evidence to persuade our speaker that Briscoe is a detective, this world remains a live possibility.
In a departure from Gunlogson (which will be addressed below), the analysis of clear presented here adopts Walker's Collaborative principle, shown in (27), which holds that conversants must provide evidence of discrepancy in belief as soon as possible.
(27) Collaborative Principle (Walker 1992) Conversants must provide evidence of a discrepancy in belief as soon as possible.
The claim made here about the semantics of clear is that in the normal course of events, when A utters it is clear to me that Briscoe is a detective, B will have no choice but to accept the fact that it is clear to A -A is the highest authority on A's beliefs. By brining in Walker's Collaborative Principle, it is possible to formalize what happens if B does not immediately express doubt about the truth or sincerity of A's statement. If B remains silent, then the di scourse model will reflect individual public commitments on the part of both A and B to A's belief in Briscoe's detectivehood.
Thus, the representation of B's commitment set as depicted in (26b) is incomplete -B's commitment set must also reflect her belief (-or acquiescence -) to A's commitment to the clarity of the proposition expressed by Briscoe is a detective, as shown in (28 Note that the commitment set of B in (28c) includes two worlds in which it is not clear to B that Briscoe is a detective -Her commitment set includes worlds eleven and world twelve, worlds in which it is clear to A that Briscoe is a detecti ve, even though it is not clear to B that Briscoe is a detective.
Example (29) shows the update effect of an assertion of simple clarity.
(29) It is clear that Briscoe is a detective.
Since the semantics of clear specify that the default interpretation of the experiencer is as the Discourse Participants, the only world that survives update is world nine, the sole world in which it is clear to both A and B that Briscoe is a detecti ve. By this analysis dialogs involving the denial of simple assertions involve contradiction and repair, while denials of assertions of personal clarity do not. Consider (3 1).
(3 1) Denial of simple assertions involve contradiction and repair A: Briscoe is a detective. B: Actually, Briscoe isn't a detective. I just asked him and he proved he's not.
In (3 1), a dialog in which A utters "Briscoe is a detective", and B replies "Actually, he's not a detective. I just asked him and he proved he's not" B's statement contradicts A's. Presumably, some form of repair must occur before the conversation can proceed. In contrast, the dialog in (32) includes A's assertion of personal clarity.
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Denial of assertions of personal clarity do not involve contradiction A: It is clear to me that Briscoe is a detective.
B: Actually, Briscoe isn't a detective. I happen to be a CIA operati ve, and I can tell you that it's all part of a supremely devious charade.
When A utters "It is clear to me that Briscoe is a detective", and B responds "Actually, Briscoe isn't a detective. I happen to be a CIA operative, and I can tell you that it is all part of a supremely devious charade", B has not contradicted A: it remains true that it was clear to A that Briscoe was a detective. Whether or not A will continue to believe in Briscoe's detectivehood will depend on her belief in the truth of B' s statement.
It is now possible to explain the status of Discourse Adjectives as "Factive Impostors". That is, it is possible to explain the observation made in the introduction that in spite of the fact that Discourse Adjectives fai l the standard diagnostics for factivity, they intuitively "feel" very factive. The explanation available given the analysis presented here is that in the absence of an overt experiencer, the entities doing the experiencing default to the speaker and addressee. The semantics of simple clarity guarantee that in the absence of an immediate and overt objection by the addressee, every world in the updated context will be a world in which the experiencer -in this case, both the speaker and the addressee -believes the truth of the proposition. The result is that, in terms of the model relevant to a particular discourse, the di scourse participants believe the proposition is likely to be true in every world in the updated context.
As spelled out in (33), asserting It is clear that p does not entail p, but it guarantees that the discourse participants are justified in behaving as if p is true.
(33)
•
In the absence of an overt experiencer, the entities doing the believing default to both the speaker and the addressee.
• The semantics of clarity guarantee that every world in the updated context will be a world in which the experiencer believes the truth of the proposition.
• The result is that all of the di scourse participants believe the truth of the proposition in every world in the updated context.
The key thing to note is that asserting clarity is purely about the judgment of the discourse participants, and not about what is the case in an y part of the world under discussion. This is precisely how asserting clarity synchronizes the common ground: it forces the speaker and addressee to acknowledge that they are in a position to treat a certain proposition as if it were a fact.
(34)
Utterances with Discourse Adjectives can help to synchronize the Context Set of a discourse by elevating the shared pri vate beliefs of the discourse participants to the status of mutual public beliefs.
This explanation of Factive Impostors provides a resolution to Lemma 2 -an assertion of personal clarity doesn't require that the speaker believes the addressee is an idiot, it merely requires that she believes a private belief is shared, and could be made public.
(35)
Resolution of Lemma 2 Isn't asserting clarity tantamount to suggesting that the hearer is an idiot? Resolution: It is sufficient for the speaker to assume that the addressee may not know that the speaker also believes that Briscoe is a detective.
As for Lemma 1, if asserting clarity adds no new information about the situation under discussion, what use is it to assert it. The resolution is that information is added. The new information regards the attitude of the discourse participants towards the proposition in question. Resolution : information is added about the attitude of the discourse participants.
As for the reconstructed paradox, that it is clear that p is asserted only in situations in which it is in fact not clear that p, the resolution comes from the understanding that asserting clarity does not require asserting perfect clarity. By recognizing the role of vagueness, it is possible to capture how asserting clarity means that the proposition in question is merely clear enough -in particular, we see that asserting clarity means that the proposition is clear enough to proceed as if it were true.
(37)
Resolution of The Reconstructed Paradox
It is clear that p is only asserted in situations in which it is in fact not clear that p.
Notes on the Implementation of Gunlogson: Degrees of Commitment
The fi nal section of this paper will briefly discuss a consequence of updating Gunlogson 's model with degrees. This modification provides a means to represent degrees of public commitment to a proposition , which is good, since a How DISCOURSE ADJECfIVES SYNCHRONIZE TIm SPEAKER AND TIm LISTENER'S BELIEFS
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comparison across the class of Discourse Adjective reveals that an individual's degree of public commitment toward a proposition can be vague.
Consider the sentences in (38), as possibly uttered by Briscoe upon his arrival and brief survey of the scene of the crime. (38) a. It is apparent that Mr. Body was murdered in the conservatory with the candlestick. b. It is evident that Mr. Body was murdered in the conservatory with the candlestick. c. It is clear that Mr. Body was murdered in the conservatory with the candlestick. d. It is obvious that Mr. Body was murdered in the conservatory with the candlestick.
Imagine that the truth is that Mr. Body was murdered in the Billiard Room with the lead pipe. Intuition suggests us that if Briscoe utters (38a) and later finds out that he was wrong, we might reasonably expect him to be mildly surpri sed.
However, if Briscoe had instead uttered (38d), an observer might reasonably fi nd it odd if he showed only mild surprise when he learned that his an alysis was incorrect. This suggests that "obvious" expresses a higher degree of public commitment to a proposition than does "apparent".
Consider the data that drove Gunlogson to isolate individual commitment sets. Her concern was the data shown in (39): the declarative sentence with falling intonation it's raining, the declarative sentence with rising intonation it 's raining ?, and the interrogative sentence with rising intonation is it raining ? Gunlogson notes that with falling intonation, an utterance of it's raining implicates a speaker's commitment to the content of the proposition expressed by that sentence, while an utterance of it's raining ?, with rising intonation, implicates commitment on the part of the addressee. This is why, for example, an utterance like (40) has what might be considered an impolite implication: Ah, so you 've stopped drowning kittens ? suggests that the addressee has in fact previously drowned kittens.
(40)
Ah, so you've stopped drowning kittens?
A significant modification that I have made to Gunlogson 's model is that I allow utterances to directly influence the commitment sets of individual di scourse participants. Gunlogson merely wanted access to individual commitments to define the notion of Contextual Bias, which allowed her to state a condition on the fe licitous utterance of a rising declarative. She notes that a condition on the appropriate use of (39b) or (40) is that the context must already be biased toward the propositions expressed by it 's raining or you 've stopped drowning kittens by virtue of the addressee's prior public commitment to them. She achieves this by positing the Contextual Bias Condition, stated descriptively in (4 1).
(4 1) Contextual Bias Condition (Gunlogson 2001:6) Rising dec1arati ves can only be used as questions in contexts where the Addressee is already publicly committed to the proposition expressed.
The analysis presented here is not meant to dispute Gunlogson' s an alysis. The claim is merely that an accurate description of the semantics of Discourse Adjectives require more than the notion of contextual bias. Gunlogson shows that ri sing declaratives pattern like interrogatives in allowing a reading in which the speaker is understood to be skeptical of the proposition expressed. Falling declarati ves cannot co-occur with overt expressions of skepticism. An example she provides to illustrate this fact is given in (42). In terms that incorporate vagueness, this can be restated as follows: ri sing intonation signals a degree of commitment to the truth of a proposition that is less than the minimum standard for absolute commitment, while fal ling intonation signals a degree of commitment that is at least as great as that standard. This can be translated into a diagnostic for degrees of commitment involved with deri vationally related Discourse Adverbs, as shown in (43). (43) [Offi ce Gossip maintains that a co-worker's driving has recently improved. A & B are looking at that co-worker's much-dented car, A says
to B]: a. Apparently her driving has gotten a lot better, but I'm not so sure it's true. b. Evidently her dri ving has gotten a lot better, but I'm not so sure it's true. c. #Clearly her driving has gotten a lot better, but I'm not so sure it's true.
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d. #Obviously her driving has gotten a lot better, but I'm not so sure it's true.
The difference in acceptability of these utterances is explained through consideration of degrees of probability. Specifically, the adverbs derived from apparent and evident impose relatively loose standards with respect to the minimum degree of probability they tolerate. This allows the speaker to remain skeptical of the truth of the proposition expressed by her driving has gotten a lot better. Because of this, the assertions with apparently or evidently are compatible with overt expressions of doubt, as in (43a,b).
In contrast, the sentences with clearly and obviously, which impose a higher minimum standard of probability, and do not allow such an overt expression of doubt. Inconsistency results when sentences with adverbs derived from clear and obvious are uttered with a skeptical follow-up. Thus, clear and obvious pattern like falling declarati ves in strongly committing the speaker to the proposition expressed.
These points about degrees of commitment lead to the final point to make regarding the notion of commitment. This point has to do with the attribution of co m mitment to individual participants in a discourse. As summarized in (44), Gunlogson shows that a speaker can use faIling intonation to signal her own commitment to the propositional content of an utterance, and a speaker can use RISING intonation to signal commitment on the part of the addressee. • DECLARATIVE SENTENCE FORM contributes commitment • INTERROGATIVE SENTENCE FORM contributes a lack of commitment b. The intonational contour of a sentence compositionally attributes commitment to a discourse participant.
• FALLING INTONATION attributes commitment to the speaker • RISING INTONATION attributes commitment to the addressee A natural question to ask following this is: how does a speaker signal commitment on the part of both herself and the addressee -that is, all of the di scourse participants -to the propositional content of a declarative sentence? There appears to be no intonational contour that serves this function in English. But the analysis presented in this paper shows that Discourse Adjectives fill this role in the grammar. The use of a Discourse Adjective in a declarative sentence with fal ling intonation is a strategy a speaker can adopt to commit both speaker and addressee to the content of a proposition by uttering a single sentence, such as the central example of this paper, repeated in (45). (45) It's clear that Briscoe is a detective.
Further, this analysis of Discourse Adjectives combined with Gunlogson's compositional analysis of rising intonation makes a prediction about the meaning of an utterance of a decl arative sentence with a Discourse Adjective and ri sing intonation, as in (46). (46) It's clear that Briscoe is a detective?
The prediction is that an utterance of (46) signals a commitment on the part of the addressee to the belief that the interlocutors agree that Briscoe is a detecti ve. This prediction is borne out. The combination of Gunlogson 's Cntextual Bias Condition with the semantics provided here for Discourse Adjectives, accurately captures the semantics of (46), as well as the intuiti on that its utterance can only be felicitously uttered in a situation that is contextually biased towards both discourse participants already being publicly committed to the proposition expressed by (45).
In Conclusion
This paper has introduced Discourse adjectives, explained their ability to seem factive, and in so doing has shown that when an assertion of simple clarity is accepted in the discourse model, the interlocutors are licensed to proceed as if the designated proposition is true, if only for the sake of the current discussion. The an alysis provides empirical support for Stalnaker's claim that the discourse model must contain a representation of the conversation taking place, and Gunlogson's call for a fi nely articulated model of the Common Ground that di stinguishes between the public commitments of the speaker and addressee. It should be noted, however, that the implementation presented here may go beyond what either of these researchers originally intended.
Finally, as for Discourse Adjectives themselves, they have been shown to be a unique type of predicate. Their context-update effect is entirely metalinguistic. They provide interlocutors with a means of speaking directly about their conversation, which allows for the synchronization of the Common Ground in a di scourse.
